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The late 1960s through the 1980s marked an unprecedented period of vibrant activity in theatre 
theory. Throughout this period, a steadily expanding group of international scholars from France, 
Italy, Germany, Poland, Israel, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, among other 
countries, joined forces to develop a comprehensive and unified semiotic theory of theatre — a 
project that picked up on the earlier wave of semiotic performance theory centered in Prague in 
the 1930s and 1940s. This second semiotic wave had largely subsided by the early 1990s. The 
collapse of semiotics might well have cleared the way for a new approach to theatre theory based 
on a fruitful re-conceptualization of the theatre event. Instead, for many years the reverberations 
of semiotics’ critical implosion had a stultifying effect on sustained and rigorous philosophical 
explorations into the phenomenon of theatre (with a few significant exceptions that I will discuss 
later). Only now, after a quarter of a century, are significant numbers of theatre and performance 
scholars once again investigating fundamental problems about the theatre event from a 
philosophical perspective. 
A key factor inhibiting theatre philosophy after the apparent failure of the semiotic project is the 
profound — and largely justified — scepticism about universal, essentialist, and ahistorical 
theoretical models that became a pervasive feature of the intellectual landscape in the United 
States and United Kingdom, in particular, just as semiotics was reaching its apex in the late 1980s, 
when poststructural theory (which of course itself had been steadily gaining steam since the late 
1960s) became the dominant force among literary and theatrical scholars. It is possible, however, 
to ask basic philosophical questions about the ‘nature’ of theatre and performance without falling 
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into the trap of universalizing or essentializing what are, in fact, historically and/or culturally 
specific practices and biases. In this essay, I advocate an open-ended and dialogic process that 
characterizes the work of many contemporary philosophers, in both the analytic and continental 
traditions, and in particular those who have been inspired by the late-Wittgensteinian notion of 
philosophy as a kind of conceptual therapy. 
The collapse of the semiotic enterprise 
It is important to begin by distinguishing semiotics as a theory of theatre — that is, as an attempt to 
define and explain the theatre event as a whole and the functions of and relationships among its 
constituent parts — from semiotics as a critical methodology, that is, as one tool among many that 
can be used to analyse specific dramatic texts, performances, or genres. Semiotics as a critical tool 
remains perfectly viable, and is commonly and effectively used in conjunction with other 
approaches, most notably various forms of materialist criticism (see, for example, Knowles 2004). 
What characterized the ambitious theoretical enterprise that flourished briefly in the 1970s and 
1980s was the attempt to use semiotic theory to construct a generalized and comprehensive model 
of the theatre event. 
Semiotics is a top-down theoretical exercise. Eli Rozik, a key figure in second wave semiotics, 
explains that he turned to semiotics for a ‘scientific’ foundation for the study of theatre: ‘From the 
beginning of my theatre studies I tried to apply a scientific approach to the discipline. [...] Forty 
years ago, my goal seemed to be easily achievable, under the hegemony of the semiotic approach’ 
(Rozik 2014, xi). In 1964, at the dawn of the second wave of semiotics, Roland Barthes published 
Elements of Semiology (translated into English in 1967), describing the ‘sole aim’ of his project as ‘the 
extraction from linguistics of analytical concepts which we think a priori to be sufficiently general 
to start semiological research on its way’ (Barthes 1967). Theatre semioticians appropriated a 
collection of concepts proposed by C.S. Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure and later expanded and 
refined by subsequent linguists and philosophers. Some semioticians (such as Erika Fischer-Lichte) 
aligned themselves more closely with Peirce and the pragmatic tradition that he inspired, while 
others (such as Barthes and Patrice Pavis) aligned themselves more closely with Saussure and the 
structuralist tradition. In fact, Peirce and Saussure conceive of the sign in radically different ways, 
with Peirce repeatedly emphasizing the irreducibly triadic nature of signs, and Saussure equally 
emphatic about its inherently binary structure. Nonetheless, most theatre semioticians uncritically 
combine concepts from both theorists, discussing, for example, Saussure’s distinction between the 
signifier and signified and Peirce’s distinction between iconic, indexical and semiotic signs in the 
same breath. There was little opportunity for the potential contradictions that might arise from 
mixing these two systems to come to light, however, since theatre semioticians rarely looked 
backwards to examine the philosophical arguments that Saussure and Peirce offered in support 
of their respective conceptions of the semiotic process; instead, they typically took established 
semiotic premises as givens and devoted their efforts to applying them to theatre. 
The most basic premise underlying semiotic theory is that whatever phenomenon it examines (in 
this case, theatre) functions first and foremost as a sign system. Crucially, this premise itself is not 
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subject to question within the semiotic paradigm; it is the initial assumption that sets the theory’s 
engine in motion. This premise, in turn, encompasses two ideas: (1) that the primary function of 
the phenomenon in question is to signify or communicate, and (2) that it does so by employing a 
systematic set of signifying conventions and codes, analogous to a language. Umberto Eco clearly 
articulates these presuppositions at the start of his seminal treatise on general semiotics, A Theory 
of Semiotics: 
The aim of this book is to explore the theoretical possibility and the social function 
of a unified approach to every phenomenon of signification and/or communication. 
Such an approach should take the form of a general semiotic theory, able to explain 
every case of sign-function in terms of underlying systems of elements mutually 
correlated by one or more codes. (Eco 1976, 3) 
Similarly, Erika Fischer-Lichte begins what is perhaps the single most rigorous and comprehensive 
attempt to construct a coherent theory of theatre semiotics, The Semiotics of Theater (initially 
published in three volumes 1983 as Semiotik des Theaters), by flatly setting forth the proposition 
that ‘Everything which humans produce is “significant” for themselves and each other, because 
humans in principle live “in a signifying world”, that is, in a world where everything that is perceived 
is perceived as a signifier which must be judged to have a signified, i.e., a meaning’ (Fischer-Lichte 
1992, 1). 
As the Prague semiotician Jiri Veltrusky famously pronounced, from the semiotic perspective, 
‘everything on stage is a sign’ (Veltrusky [1940] 1964, 84), and the theatre event as a whole is, in 
Marco de Marinis’ widely adopted coinage, a ‘performance text’ (de Marinis [1982] 1992). Keir Elam, 
one of the first writers to bring semiotics to the attention of English-language theatre scholars, 
clearly articulates one of the most significant — and problematic — implications of this textual 
conception of theatrical performance: ‘What converts objects, people and action into signs on stage 
[…] is the removal of the performance from praxis. This may seem self-evident and commonplace, 
but upon this simple act of severance rests the whole power of theatrical semiosis, indeed its very 
existence’ (Elam 1977, 14). Fischer-Lichte makes a closely related point when she emphasizes that 
theatre removes cultural signs (such as language and gesture) from their regular use, and 
consequently that ‘theatrical signs must, at least at the level of the system they form, be classified 
exclusively as iconic signs’ (Fischer-Lichte 1992, 15). An icon (as defined by Peirce) is a sign that 
represents its object by virtue of resembling it, like a picture (Peirce 1931-58, vol. 3, 362); hence, in 
describing the theatre event, taken as a whole, as iconic (a view widely espoused by theatre 
semioticians), Fischer-Lichte presupposes an inherently mimetic conception of theatrical 
performance. 
The semiotic perspective exerts a powerful pull, profoundly influencing intuitions and perceptions. 
As Peirce himself asserted, ‘Nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign’ (Peirce 1931-58, vol. 
2, 172). Once we start looking for signs, we see them everywhere. Indeed, the paradigm’s efficacy 
as a critical tool derives precisely from the way it compels us, as materialist critics would say, to 
‘read against the grain’: to look through performance events and reveal meanings that otherwise 
would remain latent or subliminal. At the same time, the power of the semiotic perspective to alter 
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our experience of the theatre event complicates and distorts the efforts of those whose goal, as it 
was for second wave semiotic theatre theorists, is to attain an accurate, rich, and far-reaching 
understanding of the way that theatre actually functions for audiences. 
Semiotics’ enabling gesture of severing theatrical spaces, objects, performers, and actions from 
praxis proved to be its Achilles heel. The semiotic perspective neglects, and even negates, precisely 
what, for many scholars and audiences, is most salient and compelling about theatrical 
performance: its status as performance, as an event in the world that engages living human beings 
both on stage and off, and not merely as a species of text.1 
By the 1980s a number of semioticians began to run up against the limits of the semiotic paradigm. 
Some attempted to fix the problem through an additive process, trying to keep the semiotic model 
intact and supplementing it with other theoretical approaches. For example, writing in 1982, de 
Marinis acknowledges that ‘the study of theater sub specie semioticae does not exhaust all aspects 
of theater. Like every other cultural object, theater is not only signification and communication, 
even if it can be understood more fully if one approaches it from the standpoint of signification 
and communication’ (de Marinis [1982] 1992, 1).  He notes that ‘Up to now, semiotic approaches to 
theater generally operated [...] within a structuralist framework’ that failed to recognize ‘the 
conditions of its production and reception’ (3). To address this lacuna, he divides his analysis into 
two distinct parts: the first dealing with ‘co-textual’ (structuralist) aspects of theatre, and the 
second, with ‘contextual’ (pragmatic) aspects. Similarly, Jean Alter, in his 1990 book A Socio-Semiotic 
Theory of Theatre, sharply distinguishes what he calls the ‘referential’ function of performance, that 
is, the display of objects, people, and language that function as signs, from the ‘performant’ 
function, which highlights the material, sensual presence of bodies, objects, and sounds. Alter 
argues that in theatre, 
every sign invites a close scrutiny of its materiality, a potential source of aesthetic 
or erotic appeal. In a dialogue, we identify spoken works as signifiers by the 
perception of their distinctly coded sound; but, at the same time, we pay attention 
to the pleasant or unpleasant quality of the voice. A common signifier of a king [sic] 
status is a crown on the actor’s head: but while acknowledging the crown as [a] sign 
of royalty, we may also appreciate it as a jeweler’s creation. (Alter 1990, 25) 
Bert O. States, in his 1985 phenomenological study of theatre Great Reckonings in Little Rooms, 
comes at the problem from the opposite direction and ends up in much the same place. He 
criticizes semiotics for ‘its almost imperialistic confidence in its product: that is, its implicit belief 
that you have exhausted a thing’s interest when you have explained how it works as a sign’ (States 
1985, 7). By contrast, he describes his own phenomenological project as focusing ‘on the activity of 
theater making itself out of its essential materials: speech, sound, movement, scenery, text, etc.’ (1). 
Like Alter, States embraces a binary model of theatre, in his case designating the two aspects 
‘semiotic’ and ‘phenomenological’. Rather than proposing phenomenology as an alternative to 
semiotics, he diplomatically proposes ‘that semiotics and phenomenology are best seen as 
complementary perspectives on the world and on art’ (8).  
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Once semioticians replaced the sweeping proposition that everything on stage is a sign with the 
far more modest claim that there are signs in the theatre, or more precisely, that people and 
objects in the theatre function on many levels simultaneously, including, sometimes, as signs, 
semiotics could no longer serve as the foundation for a unified theory of theatre. In the forward to 
his 1982 book Languages of the Stage: Essays in the Semiology of Theatre, Patrice Pavis looks back 
nostalgically to a time ‘less than ten years ago’ when ‘the now rhetorical question of the possibility 
of a semiology of theatre was not yet incongruous’, and acknowledges that ‘recent developments 
in theatre studies have made a global treatise on semiology, if not out of place, at least extremely 
problematical’ (Pavis 1982, 20). 
Theory construction vs. conceptual analysis 
Fernando de Toro published the initial Spanish-language edition of his contribution to the 
semiotics of theatre in 1987, and the English edition followed in 1995; in the intervening eight years, 
he ruefully observes, ‘the whole semiotic and structuralist paradigm came tumbling down 
strenuously with the emergence of the Post-Structuralists and Deconstructionists. It seemed after 
a while that producing diagrams and arrows had been unnecessarily obtrusive and did not get us 
anywhere’ (Toro 1995, 1-2). As the semiotic edifice was collapsing in the late 1980s, new paradigms, 
most notably clustering around concepts of social identity and performativity, were gaining 
prominence that might, potentially, have formed the foundation for a new overarching theory of 
theatre, but the demise of semiotics occurred at a critical moment when there was little appetite 
for embarking on such theoretical endeavours. In his hugely influential essay on ‘The Postmodern 
Condition’, Jean-François Lyotard famously proclaimed the end of metanarratives (Lyotard 1984). 
Jacques Derrida’s devastating critique of Western logocentricism and the principles of 
Enlightenment rationalism — which began with a deconstruction of the work of Husserl and 
Saussure, founding figures of phenomenology and structural linguistics, respectively — was 
making deep inroads among Anglo-American scholars in literature and the arts (Derrida 1973; 
Derrida 1976).  
While the impact of the poststructuralist revolution was more muted within the analytic tradition 
that dominated Anglo-American philosophy than it was in literature and the arts (in no small part 
because structuralism itself never established a strong grip on analytic philosophers), by the early 
1990s a similar aversion to totalizing theories and metanarratives had taken root within that 
tradition. Peter Kivy, in his 1993 presidential address to the American Society for Aesthetics, asserts 
that: 
Progress in the philosophy of art in the immediate future is to be made not by 
theorizing in the grand manner, but by careful and imaginative philosophical 
scrutiny of the individual arts and their individual problems. We can no longer hover 
above our subject matter like Gods from machines, bestowing theory upon a 
practice in sublime and sometimes even boastful ignorance of what takes place in 
the dirt and mess of the workshop. (Kivy 1993, 128) 
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Kivy advocates an approach to philosophical inquiry that tackles individual problems in depth, one 
at a time, from multiple perspectives, rather than a top-down approach that attempts to derive a 
field’s broad theoretical infrastructure from a limited number of key ideas and then use that 
overarching theory to address specific features and problems. 
Kivy’s scepticism about grand theorizing and his insistence that philosophical inquiry about art be 
firmly rooted in lived experience, in this case artistic practice, taps into a major current in twentieth 
century analytic philosophy. In particular, it harkens back to the approach to philosophy that 
Ludwig Wittgenstein developed during the second phase of his philosophical career. The writings 
and lectures that Wittgenstein produced in Cambridge from 1929-1947, culminating in the 
posthumous publication of Philosophical Investigations in 1953, had a revolutionary impact on 
numerous fields of philosophical inquiry, including the philosophy of language, psychology, 
epistemology, action, science, and mathematics. Many of the specific concepts and approaches he 
developed have direct implications for theatre and performance theory. The most significant 
example is Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘language games’. This conception of language upended the 
presupposition that language functions primarily to communicate, convey meaning, or picture 
reality — a presupposition that formed the basis of almost all previous work in the philosophy of 
language including his own earlier Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and is the enabling premise 
underlying semiotic theory — and ushered in the field that J.L. Austin a few years later would dub 
‘speech act theory’. Another example is Wittgenstein’s analysis of perception, and in particular the 
phenomenon of ‘seeing as’, which has been immensely influential within the analytic philosophy 
of art, and, I have argued, offers an effective way to understand the role representation plays in 
theatrical performance (see Saltz 2006).   
My primary focus here, however, is not on any specific concept or insight to be found within 
Wittgenstein’s work, but on the way Wittgenstein redefined the nature of philosophical activity. 
Wittgenstein disparages the tendency to reduce the complexities and richness of lived reality to 
abstractions and generalizations by making sweeping pronouncements about topics such as, for 
example, language, subjective experience, and ethics. Such generalizations permeate both the folk 
philosophy that constitutes what we call ‘common sense’ and formal philosophical 
pronouncements advanced by professional philosophers. Consequently, he dedicates much of his 
effort to exposing, interrogating, and ultimately dissolving a-priori theoretical generalizations, such 
as that ‘words signify objects’, that are not merely highly reductive and misleading, but very often 
give rise to pseudo-problems that preoccupy philosophers. For Wittgenstein, philosophy is not a 
process of theory construction but a therapeutic activity, a way of unraveling the conceptual 
muddles created by traditional philosophy. Philosophers need to attend carefully to the way 
people actually use words to understand the work they do and the role they play within the 
particular language games of which they are a part: ‘When philosophers use a word—“knowledge”, 
“being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name”, — and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must 
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used this way in the language which is its original 
home?’ (Wittgenstein 1958, 116). He famously suggests that ‘For a large class of cases—though not 
for all— in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be explained thus: the meaning of a word is 
its use in the language’ (43). Importantly, he rejects any effort to enforce philosophical dogmas, 
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including and especially regarding the method of philosophy itself: “there is not a philosophical 
method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies’ (133).  
Richard Wollheim’s landmark book Art and Its Objects, first published in 1968, initiated an era of 
discourse in the philosophy of art that is, in important respects, Wittgensteinian in spirit. Wollheim 
rejects attempts by earlier philosophers to define a timeless essence of art or aesthetic experience. 
Instead he recognizes that art is a collection of historical social practices (Wollheim 1980, 151), and 
explicitly invokes Wittgenstein when he describes art as a ‘form of life’ (104). He starts with what 
looks like a typically philosophical question: ‘What is art?’ But rather than giving us the sort of 
answer we might expect from a philosopher, a definition of art, ‘a unitary answer, an answer of the 
form “Art is …”’ (1), he starts by considering a remarkably obvious and literal hypothesis: ‘that works 
of art are physical objects’ (4). This proposition sets him off on a rich and circuitous path of inquiry. 
Along the way, he ends up delving deeply into issues concerning ontology, expression, 
representation, and interpretation. He reaches some significant conclusions: for example, he 
eventually draws a distinction between individual art forms, such as sculpture, in which works of 
art are indeed physical objects, and multiple art forms, such as poetry, in which the art object is a 
type concept. (Importantly, such distinctions are not inherent in the objects themselves, but in the 
social practices in which those objects are embedded.) He never, however, purports to offer a 
complete and self-contained theory of art. Wollheim’s book marks the start of a lively, productive, 
and sustained discourse in the philosophy of art that continues to the present day. The 
transformative impact that Wollheim’s book had on the philosophy of art derives, not from its 
conclusions, but from the types of questions it addresses and the way it goes about addressing 
them.  
This neo-Wittgensteinian mode of philosophical analysis represents a powerful alternative to the 
sort of top-down theory that semiotics exemplifies, and provides a way to re-frame questions 
about theatre and performance. For example, one of the central challenges for theatre semiotics 
was to define the relationship between the dramatic text and performance text. Notice that the 
way semiotics formulates the issue already limits the range of solution we can provide. It takes as 
given that we are dealing with two parallel texts, each of which functions as a sign or set of signs. I 
call this the ‘two-text’ model of theatre. This perspective naturally led many semioticians to 
describe the relationship of text to performance as one of translation or transcodification. 
However, the two-text model does not correspond with the way we actually talk about theatrical 
performance. When we go to the theatre, we typically say that we are going to see a play. At first 
blush, one might be inclined to suggest that the terms ‘play’ and ‘dramatic text’ are synonymous, 
but they actually work very differently. When I look at a copy of a script, I am ‘seeing a dramatic 
text’. When I see a play, I am seeing the dramatic text performed. So does it follow that the term 
‘play’ is synonymous with ‘performance text’? No. Significantly, we can also use the word ‘play’ to 
refer to the printed script, for example if we say ‘I just bought the play from Amazon’, or ‘I’ve read 
the play but I haven’t seen it yet’. So the word ‘play’ seems to refer both to the performance text 
and the dramatic text. If we remain under the sway of semiotic theory, we might be tempted to 
reject our ordinary way of speaking as sloppy, and propose that the word ‘play’ actually has two 
meanings. However, if we pause to consider more carefully how we are using the word, we will see 
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that the real problem is that the two-text model fails to capture the logic of theatrical performance. 
‘Play’, as Wollheim observed, is a type concept. Specifically, a play is a type of performance. The 
relationship between play and performance is not one of translation (indeed if we consider the 
matter closely we’ll see that being the translation of a play is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for being a performance of that play). The relationship is one of instantiation. The text of 
a play, then, is a component that contributes to the definition of the play-type; in order for a 
performance to be a performance of Hamlet, it needs to incorporate the dialogue of the play in a 
particular way. What, exactly, that way is depends on a set of performance conventions that can 
change over time and vary from one community to another; in other words, a performance that 
counts as Hamlet for one audience may not for another. This approach to the text/performance 
question opens up a whole range of new questions. What exactly are the conventions that define 
the performance of a play? How do those conventions vary? How do the conventions that define 
the performance of plays relate to those that define other performance-types, such as 
performance art, commedia dell’arte scenarios, rituals, games, symphonies, or songs? (For a more 
detailed discussion of some of these questions, see Saltz 1995). 
The lively and productive discourse in philosophical aesthetics has lavished considerable attention 
on the visual arts and music, but until recently philosophers touched on theatre only in passing. At 
the same time, this analytic philosophical discourse passed almost entirely under the radar of 
performance and theatre scholars. For a number of years, I occupied a somewhat peculiar position 
as a performance theorist engaged in the world of philosophical aesthetics (see Saltz, 2001). The 
past decade, however, has seen a growing number of philosophical investigations into theatre and 
performance. In addition to the essays collected in Staging Philosophy (Krasner and Saltz, 2006) and 
a growing number of articles about theatre in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, there have 
been important book-length analyses of theatre by James Hamilton (2007), Paul Woodruff (2008), 
Tom Stern (2013), and Tzachi Zamir (2014). The floodgates seem finally to have opened, and there 
is a renewed interest in exploring fundamental questions about theatre and performance from a 
philosophical perspective. 
It is important to stress that the approach to theoretical inquiry that I am extolling here — one that 
resists the rush to generalize and attends closely to the way that words and concepts actually 
function within specific communities of discourse — is by no means unique to the analytic 
tradition. Though different in important ways from most analytic philosophers, and indeed from 
each other, continental philosophers such as Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze all exemplify these 
qualities.2 Moreover, though I urge scepticism toward efforts to construct totalizing theories, my 
arguments here should not be construed as a blanket rejection of such efforts; ambitious 
theoretical models can have great explanatory power. For example, Kendall Walton builds an 
expansive account of representation in the arts on the simple premise that representation is 
rooted in viewers’ acts of ‘make-believe’ (Walton 1990). This conception of representation is 
radically different from, and in my view far more compelling than, the semiotic model, and, perhaps 
most important, in the process of arguing meticulously in support of his own unifying premise and 
against rival theories, Walton generates a wealth of cogent insights and provocations that are 
valuable regardless of whether or not one is persuaded to purchase his theory tout court.3 The 
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crucial point is that whether we adopt concepts from other theorists or invent our own, we should 
dig into those concepts deeply and question them patiently, carefully considering their 
implications, alternatives, limitations, and potential flaws. Moreover, we should ceaselessly 
challenge our own assumptions and our tendency to settle too quickly on pat theoretical formulas 
and credos. Most important, we should never shy away from asking basic questions for fear of 
violating the theoretical orthodoxy du jour. As Derrida eloquently proclaims: ‘it is necessary to keep 
philosophy as open-ended and unlimited questioning alive. The continual effort to worry over 
presuppositions, to keep on questioning and talking, is what is called philosophy, and that must be 
kept going’ (Derrida 1997, 65-66). 
 
1 John Searle’s contention that the theatrical frame strips all speech acts on stage of their illocutionary force 
comports with the semiotic conception of theatre as removed from praxis; it is not surprising, therefore, that 
semioticians uncritically embraced Searle’s conclusion. I have argued, however, that this widely accepted view 
about speech acts is simply incorrect, and that it is entirely possible for a speech act performed in the context of 
a play to satisfy all of Searle’s own conditions for an utterance to have illocutionary force (Saltz 1991). 
2 In particular, a number of writers have pointed out the significant parallels between Wittgenstein’s and Derrida’s 
approaches (see Stanten 1986; Dasenbrock 1989; and Wheeler 2000). Derrida’s practice of “deconstruction” is, 
like Wittgenstein’s, descriptive rather than prescriptive. It involves very close reading of what writers do with their 
words and concepts—which often contradicts their own theoretical formulations and reductions. 
3 In his own presidential address to the American Society for Aesthetics, Walton explicitly rebuts Kivy’s injunction 
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